*Spotlight:*/Horn of Africa

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Spotlight: Horn of Africa - Oceans Futures - WWF

Horn Of Africa | WWF / Oceans Futures

Introduction

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The Horn of Africa has some of the most productive fishing grounds in the world, including waters within the Somali Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Fishing fleets travel from across the globe to access the near-shore reef ecosystems and highly migratory species such as tropical tuna, mackerels, and billfish that travel along the Somali Current. However, the richness of these waters has not historically supported domestic fisheries.

With the longest coastline in mainland Africa, the waters of the Somali EEZ are larger than its land territory. This vastness makes it incredibly difficult to monitor and patrol. The prolonged civil war (1991–2012) meant investment in maritime security suffered, and weak law enforcement capacity, ineffective government and criminal prosecution systems, and economic insecurity exacerbated the issue. During the mid-2000s, the Horn of Africa became synonymous with piracy. The impact of piracy was significant, in part, because of Somalia’s location at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most geostrategic shipping chokepoints.

While conflict in Somalia’s waters has been significant, there has also been tremendous progress over the past decade. Piracy was nearly eliminated, and the government has increased maritime domain awareness. Our hotspot analysis shows Somalia continues to rank high in the risk of fisheries conflict, but greater information sharing and integration with the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission could help change that course.

FISHERIES CONFLICT

Fisheries conflict in the Somali region emerged from unmanaged competition over fish stocks, exacerbated by institutional instability. The presence of foreign fishers, military intervention in response to piracy, and territorial disputes made the Horn of Africa a textbook example of the consequences of decades of unmitigated illegal fishing.

### Foreign Fishing
An estimated [$450 million](https://securefisheries.org/sites/default/files/CRH-strengthening-maritime-resources.pdf) is lost to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Somali EEZ each year. Distant water fishing fleets follow commercially valuable fish stocks around the Western Indian Ocean. Somalia’s limited capacity to effectively license foreign vessels, monitor and patrol their EEZ, and enforce existing regulations means foreign vessels are not deterred from fishing illegally.

In the 1990s, following the collapse of the federal government, Somali coastal communities took matters into their own hands. Certain Somali opposition groups, such as the [Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)](https://securefisheries.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/Rough%20Seas-fisheries-conflict-somali-waters.pdf), began “arresting” vessels and demanding they purchase unofficial fishing licenses. By the mid-1990s, Somali fishers were arming themselves to defend their fish stocks from the illegal foreign vessels. In 1997, Somalis in four armed speedboats forced a foreign fishing vessel with a crew of 34 foreign nationals to the coastal village of Garacad. The crew was accused of illegal fishing and released four months later, after paying a fine of $200,000.

Eventually, organized pirate groups took over this informal licensing scheme, increasingly controlled by warlords demanding ransom for crew. Much of the [financial backing](https://securefisheries.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/Rough%20Seas-fisheries-conflict-somali-waters.pdf) for this pivot in piracy was from prominent businesspeople and politicians who used “licensing foreign vessels” for extortion. Warlords fought over fishing grounds, targeting fishing vessels inside disputed areas. [Three Taiwanese fishing vessels](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/09/03/2003270159), Chung Yi 218, Cheng Ching Feng, and Hsin Lien Feng 36, were hijacked in 2005 near Kismayo in southern Somalia. The vessels were captured despite paying application fees to the local authorities (the local warlord). Their hijackers, ex-members of the Juba Valley Alliance militia, alleged the vessels were fishing illegally.

This hijack-for-ransom strategy transformed piracy into an organized “industry.” Attacks expanded against local fishing vessels, yachts, and cargo ships. Somali pirates seized a Yemeni fishing boat in May 2008, using the vessel as a base and the Yemeni crew as decoys. A Dutch cargo ship delivering drilling platform components was hijacked at the same time in the Gulf of Aden.

Transit across the geostrategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait became more treacherous, and the threat of piracy jeopardized global commerce. Naval warship coalitions entered the region to deter piracy, but Somali and Yemeni fishers report the threat they faced from pirates was magnified by the [arrival of foreign warships](https://securefisheries.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/Rough%20Seas-fisheries-conflict-somali-waters.pdf). However, the threat of piracy did temporarily deter foreign fishing. An unintended consequence of warships quelling the piracy threat was a return of distant-water foreign fleets. In 2015, [86 percent of fishers](https://www.crc.uri.edu/download/IUU-Fishing-Final-Report-_06-11-2015.pdf) reported seeing foreign fishing vessels near the Somali coast. By the 2019–2020 fishing season, at least [200 Iranian-flagged fishing vessels](https://globalfishingwatch.org/impacts/stories/analysis-exposes-illegal-fishing-off-coasts-of-somalia-and-yemen/) were fishing illegally within the Somali EEZ.

Coastal Somali communities are frustrated that foreign fleets have returned. They are unable to protect their resources and see no intervention from the federal government or international community. Public trust in governance institutions is eroding and there are threats of another wave of piracy on the horizon.

### Foreign Militaries

The piracy problem grew beyond the capability of the fledgling federal government; the Somali government’s request for assistance brought foreign naval warship coalitions into the region. Their mission was to protect cargo vessels passing through the area and interrupt piracy attempts. For example, a British naval warship rescued a hijacked Yemeni vessel that had been sailing to Somalia to sell oil and fish. However, artisanal fishers throughout the region protested foreign warships that denied locals access to fishing grounds, sabotaged fishing nets, and confused their vessels for pirates’. In 2009, approximately 75 nm off the coast of Yemen, an Indian naval vessel approached a Yemeni dhow, mistaking it for Somali pirates. The fishers were forced to jump into the sea and tread water for two hours. All of their fish spoiled. The following year, seven Yemeni fishing boats were fired upon by a Russian helicopter and forced to board the Russian navy destroyer RFN Marshal Shaposhnikov. The fishers were robbed of their boats, money, IDs, GPS units, and clothes. The fishers were then put on a single boat and sent back. The Russian navy shot at their boat as they sailed away. Yemeni fishers claimed that the abuse cost them about 30 million Yemeni rial in damage from searches and seizures and that the forces in the region are often as dangerous as the pirates themselves.

Targeted attacks against Yemeni fishers exponentially increased during the Yemeni Civil War between the Yemeni government, backed by a Saudi-led coalition, and the Houthi movement. Both sides of the conflict targeted fishing vessels as part of their offensive strategy. The Iran-backed Houthi militias destroyed fleets of fishing boats, eliminating the sole source of income for coastal residents. The Saudi-led coalition used starvation as a weapon of war by deliberately targeting the infrastructure of Yemen’s food production and distribution. While both sides targeted fishing vessels, the Saudi-led coalition was significantly more detrimental. In May 2018, a Saudi-led coalition launched 27 airstrikes over 24 hours. Among the series of strikes, in Hudaydah province, a fisher was killed, one was injured, and three went missing following aggression from warplanes that targeted their boat. In July of that year, there were two other reported incidents of Saudi warplanes targeting fishing boats in Al-Hawak district, killing eight fishers and injuring 28. By 2019, Yemeni fishers were being abducted and tortured. The Tihami Elite, special forces affiliated with the Saudi-led coalition, abducted 17 Yemeni fishers. They were held at a prison for three days, during which they were subjected to beatings and electric shocks and had their possessions confiscated. Many fishers stopped practicing their livelihoods for fear of being targeted by fighter jets and gunships.

### Disputed Fishing Grounds

Yemeni and Somali fishers have a history of informal trading agreements across the Gulf of Aden. Yemenis would trade fuel and ice (subsidized in Yemen) with Somalis for fish or access to fishing grounds. Yemenis and Somalis both traveled the waters freely. As fish stocks began to decrease, Somali fishers became more serious about enforcing the sovereignty of their waters. Distant water fishing fleets were responsible for much of the stock decline, using high efficiency gear like commercial trawlers and purse seines, but the artisanal Yemeni fishers became easy scapegoats. In 2006, The Somaliland Coast Guard arrested 50 Yemeni fishers and seized their eight boats. Somaliland announced the event as part of a campaign to enforce territorial sovereignty, while Yemen reported the event as a pirate attack. Similar events took place every year through 2010, [putting the Yemeni fishers at risk of targeted attacks](https://securefisheries.org/news/suppliers-scapegoats-yemeni-fishers-somali-waters-height-piracy) by pirates, warships, and Somali vessels.

Yemen also battles for access on its western coast. The Hanish Islands in the Southern Red Sea are a region of high conflict and contested control between Yemen and Eritrea. The islands provide strategic military location and the waters are rich in fisheries. Eritrea and Yemen disputed the islands in 1995 and an international court awarded them to Yemen in 1998. However, the two countries have disagreed on the interpretations of the rulings regarding fishing rights in the area. During February, March, and April 2013, Eritrean authorities seized over 100 Yemeni fishing boats with about 700 Yemeni fishers on board. Like Somali efforts in the Gulf of Aden, this was part of a campaign to enforce their interpreted territorial sovereignty. The tension escalated to conflict again in 2020 when Yemeni fishers were harassed by the Eritrean Navy. The fishers were beaten and their boats were confiscated. The following month, 15 armed boats from Eritrea's navy seized 120 Yemeni fishers in the Hanish islands. The Yemeni Coast Guard responded by arresting eight members of the Eritrean navy that had allegedly seized Yemeni fishing vessels. The men were released in exchange for 55 Yemeni fishers.

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Priority Fisheries

The Horn of Africa has incredibly high biodiversity of fishes, from the demersals associated with reefs to pelagics that benefit from the high flow of intense nutrient upwelling, called the Great Whirl. The global demand for high quality tuna drives [intense targeting in the region](https://securefisheries.org/sites/default/files/SecuringSomaliFisheries-FullReport.pdf) by longline and purse seine vessels from Taiwan, Japan, Spain, India, the Maldives, Iran, China, Oman, Pakistan, Yemen, the Seychelles, and France (among others). Tropical tuna migrate long distances. Their ranges cross many countries’ EEZs and international cooperation between coastal countries and distant-water fishing nations is vital. The [Indian Ocean Tuna Commission](https://iotc.org/) (IOTC) is a voluntary Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) that monitors the stock status of tuna and tuna-like species, develops regulations for the region, and promotes cooperation among regional members. Somalia has been a member since 2014.

The continental shelf, where coral reefs and demersal fishes (e.g., grunts, emperors, jacks) and spiny lobster fisheries are located, is relatively narrow (approximately [15 km wide](https://securefisheries.org/sites/default/files/SecuringSomaliFisheries-FullReport.pdf)). These species are easier for domestic fishers to catch in small boats with artisanal gear. Illegal foreign bottom trawlers also target demersal fish and spiny lobster in the Horn of Africa region, present in these waters during most of the year. Trawlers drag their nets along the seafloor, wreaking havoc on marine habitats and diminishing fish populations. Many of these trawlers work at night and their lights can be seen from the coast, reinforcing coastal communities’ anger with foreign vessel presence.

East of Somalia’s EEZ and south of Oman’s lies a 700,000 km 2 squid fishery in unregulated waters. The targeted small squid species are [an important component of tuna diets](https://www.tm-tracking.org/post/new-analysis-squid-fishing-north-west-indian-ocean-clear-as-ink) in the region. According to Automatic Identification System (AIS) tracking, fishing increased by [830% over five years](https://maritime-executive.com/article/report-china-s-squid-fishing-fleet-has-discovered-the-indian-ocean), growing from 30 vessels in 2015 to 280 in 2019. The tracked vessels are suspected to be Chinese-flagged based on AIS identifiers and movements. This fishery has [very little management or regulatory oversight](https://www.tm-tracking.org/post/new-analysis-squid-fishing-north-west-indian-ocean-clear-as-ink), as it falls outside of the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) and outside the species mandate of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commision (IOTC).

Governance Solutions

Somali fisheries management has traditionally been governed by a top-down approach (i.e., the government has dictated decisions). These governance mechanisms are beginning to shift as regional and federal government officials and international stakeholders are increasingly recognizing the [value of local knowledge](https://www.stableseas.org/post/stable-seas-western-indian-ocean). This has the potential to improve both management capacity and government legitimacy. In addition to incorporating communities and their frustrations into the decision-making process, communities are involved in a [national data collection effort](https://securefisheries.org/news/somali-fisheries-officers-begin-phase-two-data-collection).

The presence of foreign vessels is one of the most significant causes of fisheries conflict in the region. [Global efforts to improve the traceability of distant water fishing fleets](https://globalfishingwatch.org/) will help the Horn of Africa to track and report upon their own vessels while also removing vessels that are fishing illegally. To further support the sustainability of industries dependent on the region’s fisheries, the Somali government has developed a [blue economy framework](https://nec.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Establishment-of-a-Somali-blue-economy-framework-for-Somalia.pdf) to diversify coastal economies and strengthen climate mitigation measures.

The influx of foreign military presence during the height of Somali piracy left the region with an unprecedented amount of international and regional cooperation. This cooperation laid the foundation for today’s efforts targeting maritime crimes. However, international donors often drive priorities. The Somali government is eager to have ownership over its maritime strategy, while balancing the need for engaged international enforcement.

Climate Challenges

Climate change will exacerbate vulnerabilities in fisheries-dependent coastal communities of the Western Indian Ocean. The region’s sea surface temperature has been warming at [a rate faster than any other tropical ocean region](https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/clim/27/22/jcli-d-14-00471.1.xml). Consequences include enhanced ocean stratification and suppressed nutrient upwelling, impacting the region’s food chain. Many coral species cannot survive at the projected higher temperatures. This will result in widespread habitat mortality and a decline in fisheries. Changes in ocean currents will impact fisheries through disruptions to primary productivity.

Extreme weather events such as cyclones and droughts will also increase in frequency and severity. Future storms threaten coastal communities with loss of lives and livelihood, housing destruction, food and fuel shortages, and outbreaks of locusts and disease.

The Future of Fisheries

Fisheries governance in the Horn of Africa has improved significantly since the 1990s. Governments are working to build empirically supported, resilient institutions that can function independently. Regional cooperation, data collection and sharing, and improved monitoring and enforcement capacity will be vital to strengthening commitment to this mission. Furthermore, raising awareness and involving the community are pivotal in shaping a fisheries management system that supports the region’s potential for a strong blue economy while conserving marine ecosystems for generations to come.